Water Law Review
Volume 11

Issue 1

Article 14

9-1-2007

Carl J. Bauer, Siren Song: Chilean Water Law as a Model for
International Reform
Sarah Quinn

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Sarah Quinn, Book Note, Carl J. Bauer, Siren Song: Chilean Water Law as a Model for International Reform,
11 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 185 (2007).

This Book Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue I

BOOK NOTES

Hunter and Waterman ascertained that because of the incredible
diversity in the regulatory environment, strict enforcement is unlikely
to occur, but implementing several steps could promote a strict approach. If EPA can obtain more funding, EPA could increase the
number of enforcement personnel, making strict enforcement more
feasible. Another step would be to fortify the provisions of environmental laws at both the state and federal levels. Additionally, EPA
could make the burden of proof against violators more reasonable.
Another change would be to ensure a portion of the money from civil
penalties makes it to EPA or to the state environmental agencies. In
addition, an increase in administrative fines and an increase in permitting costs would aid in strict enforcement. Hunter and Waterman
found that to accomplish minimizing the variations of enforcement
across the states we must promote the strict approach, utilize technological development, change the focus from outputs to outcomes, or
change the focus of the NPDES enforcement to one that tries to internalize the costs of pollution.
Lastly, critics have said that environmental regulation has failed because the command and control regulatory approach is inflexible. The
authors determined that moving toward an economic-incentive based
method would offer a variety of different approaches that would aim at
internalizing the external costs of pollution. According to proponents,
this system would be more efficient, effective, and easier to implement.
Hunter and Waterman conclude that in the framework of a diverse
regulatory environment, economic incentives may be a more suitable
system.
Kathleen Brady
Carl J. Bauer, Siren Song- Chilean Water Law as a Model for
International Reform, Resources for the Future, Washington D.C.
(2004); 172 pp; $33.95; ISBN 1-891853-79-1, hard cover.
Siren Song provides an overview and analysis of the free-market Chilean Water Model in the context of international water reform. Bauer,
a water researcher with extensive experience in Chile and elsewhere,
brings a social science perspective to the largely economic discussion
on water rights in developing Chile. The author takes the reader
through background on the international water policy debate, an historical overview of the free-market Chilean system, the issues surrounding reform of the Water Code, a present-day analysis of its successes
and failures, and a look towards the future.
This book evaluates the 20-plus year history of the Chilean Water
Model in order to provide the reader with insight into the Chilean experience and to highlight the significance of Chilean water policy in
the international arena. The Chilean Model has treated water rights as
heavily privatized, fully marketable commodities, and the international
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economic community has largely hailed this free-market approach as a
success. However, likening the Chilean Model to the alluring but dangerous song of a siren, Bauer attempts to show that initial praise of the
system has failed to recognize some of its severe inadequacies. In
short, he examines whether the current free-market framework is capable of handling modern water issues, such as inter-basin management and environmental quality. Furthermore, as applied within the
international context, the author explores the lessons learned from the
Chilean Model and argues for a more qualitative and diverse economic
approach.
The first chapter, The InternationalContext: The Water Crisis and Debates about Water Policy, focuses on international trends in water use and
water management perspectives. Multiple competing interests are driving the current global water crisis, including social, economic, and environmental demands. As such, three themes have dominated international water policy debates: 1) integrated water resource management
("IWRM"), 2) economic approaches that rely on market incentives,
such as the Chilean Model, and 3) emphasis on poverty and social inequity. The IWRM approach recognizes the need for comprehensive
and interdisciplinary water management and closely parallels concepts
of sustainable development. The so-called Dublin Principles articulate
this approach and call for recognition of water as an "economic good."
The chapter then explores the conflicting perspectives on the "economic good" principle, from narrow, market-oriented policies that
focus on costs, to broader approaches that incorporate human rights
and other values. The Chilean Model has been in the international
spotlight because it represents the extreme of market-oriented policies,
and because it received widespread promotion by the World Bank.
Nonetheless, Bauer asserts that this early support was premature and
lacked empirical data on whether the Chilean Model truly marked victory for neoliberal economists.
Chapter two, The Free-Market Model: Chile's 1981 Water Code, provides
an historical overview of how the Chilean system developed and the
unique attributes that affect its current implementation. The 1981
water reforms embraced the laissez faire economic principles of the
incumbent military government regime and resulted in vast changes to
the water system. The new Water Code separated water rights from
land ownership and privatized their use, almost eliminating any form
of government control, such as permits, taxes, or fees. This new neoliberal system was a vast pendulum swing away from the agrarian reforms
of the 1960s, which resulted in a social redistribution of water where all
water rights were in the public domain. The purpose, in part, of the
1981 reforms was to provide economic incentives for private investment in the country's deteriorating infrastructure of dams and canals.
However, over the last twenty years since the Water Code's implementation, Chile has struggled to reconcile the free-market model with
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its changing social system, as discussed in the next chapter, Reforming
the Reform? Policy Debate Under Chilean Democracy. During the 1980s,
there was little debate over the water policy because the government
remained under military control and the water system was still in its
early stages of implementation. However, many changes occurred in
Chile at the beginning of the 1990s, including a transformation to a
democratic government, rapid economic growth, and emerging issues
with putting the system into practice. Hence, the new legislature called
for reforms to the Chilean Model because of social inequities created
by the large water monopolies, inefficiencies resulting from non-use
and hoarding of water, the inability of the private sector to fix the
crumbling infrastructure of Chile's water system, and the failure of the
Water Code to address other emerging water issues such as water quality.
Over the subsequent decade, two major rounds of proposed reform
took place. The first wave of proposed reform failed largely because it
attempted to solve efficiency issues through a use-it-or-lose-it policy for
non-use, which neoliberal members heavily objected to. The second
round reform was more limited and pragmatic, proposing fees for nonuse, judicial oversight of water disputes, and consideration of in-stream
flow rights to promote water quality and environmental protection;
nonetheless, the proposed amendments met strong opposition which
paralyzed the legislature. Finally, in 1997, the legislature passed very
limited amendments to the Water Code, but the debate continues over
whether the rejected tax and fee structures could strengthen the legal
security of water rights, provide incentives to use water, or increase
efficiency within the system. Arguably, the free-market system has been
far from a complete success in Chile, and the country has continually
struggled to amend its shortcomings.
Chapter four, The Results of Chilean Water Markets: EmpiricalResearch
Since 1990, provides an external examination of whether the Chilean
Model has succeeded. In the international arena, Chile's free-market
approach is so representational of neoliberal policies that the debate
has become ideological instead of pragmatic. Therefore, organizations
such as the World Bank have lauded the Chilean Model as a success
while ignoring some of its lackluster performance in practice. The
United Nations, however, has been more careful in its assessment, taking notice of the large gaps in the economically driven system, such as
social and environmental policy. Nonetheless, the overall trend in the
early 1990s was a lack of any real data on system performance, leading
to exaggerated or misguided claims. Bauer then discusses some of the
more recent research on the system, finding that the market was generally inactive for the first decade and that problems have surfaced
regarding efficiency, monopoly, reallocation, and the strength of title.
Recent analysis suggests that the current system is too inflexible to deal
with more comprehensive problems, such as environmental impacts
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and water quality, return flows, paper versus actual rights, inter-basin
management, multiple use, non-consumptive use, seasonal flows, infrastructure, and social equity. The author then reviews a number of case
studies regarding management for non-consumptive water uses in a
number of different basins. Ultimately, the system is somewhat paralyzed because the Constitution vests very little authority in the water
agencies or courts to address water disputes, and thus far amending
the Constitution for water reform has proven difficult.
In the final chapter, Conclusions and Lessons about the Chilean Experience, Bauer asserts that there is growing consensus on the need to
reform the Chilean Model to address the global water crisis. Based on
the original goals of the 1981 amendments, the Chilean Model
achieved increased legal security for private water rights, freedom of
use, autonomy, and developing hydropower infrastructure; however, it
failed to increase efficiency or provide for private development of water infrastructure, and it resulted in power monopolies. Furthermore,
the Chilean Model is ill-equipped to handle the more modern water
issues of river basin management, resolution of conflicts, social equity,
and environmental protection. Therefore, in answering the essential
question of whether the Chilean Model, a narrow and free-market approach to water economics, is compatible with IWRM, the author asserts that the answer is no. The Chilean Model is part of an ongoing
debate on how we should define water rights, and Bauer proposes that
a better alternative would be interdisciplinary, provide for public participation and representation in the process, and be more flexible to
deal with evolving conflicts.
Siren Song adds an informed and pragmatic voice to the debate on
whether the Chilean Model provides a successful blueprint for water
reform. The book presents a much needed counterpoint to globally
influential organizations, such as the World Bank, that have championed the free-market approach while ignoring its inadequacies.
Bauer avoids some of the classic ideological pitfalls when discussing
water policy and instead relies on a scientific, results-based approach in
his analysis. At a time when the global water crisis is at the forefront of
environmental concerns, understanding the strengths and weaknesses
of this infamously free-market system is paramount for any practitioner
who desires an in-depth understanding of economic water policy.
Moreover, Siren Song reiterates the call for better social and environmental policies in water use and management.
Sarah Quinn

